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Principles for the 
responsible legal 
regulation of cannabis
Legal markets should seek 
to distribute power and 
value across the supply 
chain by enabling 
alternative business 
models that 
empower 
communities.
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Health and human rights of people who use drugs
3. AUTONOMY, 
LIBERTY & PRIVACY
2. PUBLIC HEALTH
& HARM REDUCTION
1. PROTECT RIGHTS
Regulations should seek a fair 
balance between individual 
rights to autonomy and 
privacy, and the 
protection of 
public health. All 
restrictions must 
be based on 
evidence.
Legal regulation can be a 
powerful harm reduction tool, 
reducing stigma against people 
who use drugs, enabling access 
to health services, 
and guaranteeing 
a safe supply of 
drugs.
Regulated markets enable 
consumer protection and health 
regulations to uphold the rights 
of people who use drugs, 
while labor laws 
protect cannabis 
workers from 
exploitation and 
Social justice
6. TRANSIT 
TO LEGALITY
Legal markets must support 
the participation of people 
and communities involved in 
informal drug economies by 
removing existing legal, 
nancial, 
technical, and 
bureaucratic 
barriers.
7. SMALLER-SCALE
GROWERS
To guarantee sustainable 
livelihoods for traditional 
cannabis farmers, legal 
regulations should prioritise 
their participation in supply, 
and ensure 
they are 
not 
displaced 
by new 
private 
actors.
8. REPARATION, 
SATISFACTION &
NON-REPETITION
5. COMMUNITY 
INVOLVEMENT
9. TRADITIONAL USES
Legal systems should be 
informed by the wealth of 
knowledge accumulated by 
people involved in currently 
illegal markets, from 
cultivators to 
people who 
transport, sell 
and use 
cannabis. 
Legal frameworks must 
include reparations for 
people  who suered 
prohibition, 
redress rights 
violations, and 
aloccate 
resources to 
those 
unjustly 
targeted.
Inclusive & equitable trade
A gender-sensitive approach
Legal regulations must 
recognise the value of 
cannabis’ rich history of 
traditional, cultural, 
religious and 
medical uses, 
and ensure 
their 
preservation.
Responses to activities
outside of the legal market
Monitoring and learning
11. WORKERS RIGHTS 12. MAXIMISE VALUE
13. CHALLENGES TO 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
10. INCLUSIVE 
BUSINESS MODELS
14. ENVIRONMENTAL
SUSTAINABILITY
In a legal system, 
workers are entitled to 
labour rights and 
protections, which can 
be enforced 
through formal 
oversight 
mechanisms. 
Regulators should work with 
producers and users to develop 
innovative certication 
schemes that bolster the 
competitiveness 
of small and 
medium-sized 
producers. 
Regulators should reect 
on how to remove the 
legal barriers that impede 
the transnational trade of 
non-medical cannabis, 
while protecting traditional 
growers from the inow of 
foreign capital.
To address potential environmental 
harms, legal frameworks must 
include strong regulations, 
as well as ecolabeling 
schemes, to promote 
sustainable practices 
throughout the supply 
chain.
16. PROPORTIONALITY
15. DECRIMINALISE 
ALL DRUG USE & 
ANCILLARY ACTIVITIES
17. WOMEN &
CULTIVATION
20. DATA COLLECTION &
COMMUNITY FEEDBACK
A socially just legal framework 
is not compatible with 
any form of criminal 
or administrative 
punishment for the 
personal use of any 
drug.
Where retained, criminal justice 
responses to drug-related 
activities, such as drug 
tracking, must be 
strictly proportionate, 
consider personal 
circumstances, and 
accompanied by 
support.
In addressing the history of 
discrimination and harassment 
of women growers, legal 
regulations should 
establish gender-
sensitive protections 
against exploitation 
and abuse.
17. ACCESS TO
SERVICES
Legal regulations must 
promote gender-sensitive 
drug treatment and harm 
reduction services that 
respond to 
the specic 
needs of 
women.
17. EQUALITY
Regulators must take 
immediate action to address 
structural gender inequalities 
and power 
imbalances 
in legal 
cannabis 
markets.
Legal frameworks must be 
constantly reviewed in light 
of objective data, lessons 
learnt, the evolution of 
the market, and 
feedback provided by 
aected communities 
and civil society.
PRINCIPLES FOR THE RESPONSIBLE LEGAL REGULATION OF CANNABIS - VISUAL INFOGRAPHIC SUMMARY
4. ACCESSIBLE 
& NEEDS-BASED
To become a viable alternative to the 
informal supply, regulated markets 
need to be accessible, 
and to respond to 
the needs of people 
who use drugs, 
including users of 
cannabis-based 
medical products. 
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4In recent years, discussions on the legal regulation of 
drugs – and in particular of cannabis – have moved in 
from the margins of drug policy debates. As of today, 
over 50 countries have adopted regulatory frameworks 
for medical cannabis, while a growing number of jurisdic-
tions have regulated adult non-medical use, with many 
more poised to follow. As these legal frameworks are put 
in place, it is essential that they are designed to advance 
social justice, inclusion and human rights. 
The legal regulation of a scheduled drug is not a silver 
bullet that solves all the harmful outcomes of prohibi-
tion. Legal regulation has the potential to become a pow-
erful tool to redress decades of criminalisation, economic 
exclusion, and lack of access to appropriate health care. 
However, legal markets can also be captured by corpo-
rate interests, fail to include comprehensive measures to 
redress the harms brought by the ‘war on drugs’, and fur-
ther criminalise people that remain in the illegal spaces 
inevitably persisting outside any regulated market.
The more than 195 members of the IDPC network op-
erate in a wide variety of legal, political, and cultural 
contexts around the world. As befits this diversity, some 
IDPC members do actively advocate for legal regulation, 
while others focus on different public health and social 
justice measures, such as harm reduction and decrim-
inalisation.  But the legal regulation of cannabis, either 
for medical or adult non-medical use, is fast becoming an 
unescapable debate. 
To address this challenge, this Advocacy Note proposes 
twenty principles that should inform any regulatory 
framework for cannabis markets, whether for medical 
or for adult non-medical use. They are arranged in 
five categories:
• First, legal markets should protect the health and hu-
man rights of people who use drugs, providing them 
with comprehensive access to health services, and 
with the full range of rights and protections ordinarily 
granted to consumers in legal markets. 
• Second, legal markets must advance social justice by 
seeking to repair the harms of punitive policies, and 
ensuring that communities most affected by prohibi-
tion, which in many cases have been oppressed on the 
basis of race, gender identity or sexual orientation, are 
able to transition into the legal market -if they want. 
• Third, regulatory frameworks should promote busi-
ness models and international trade policies that ad-
vance economic inclusion, sustainable development, 
and climate justice throughout local, regional and 
global supply chains. 
• Fourth, legal reforms must remove punishments for 
personal drug use and ancillary activities, including 
for substances or activities that fall outside the scope 
of regulated markets. If sanctions are still imposed for 
traffic-related activities, punitive responses should be 
strictly proportionate, and accompanied by other in-
terventions. 
• Fifth, legal regulation must adopt a gender-sensitive 
approach, in order to redress the disproportionate 
harm and exclusion experienced by women under 
prohibition.
Finally, new regulatory frameworks should include mech-
anisms for collecting, analysing and disseminating com-
prehensive data on drug markets and drug use, as legal 
regulation is an ongoing iterative process that responds 
to the evolution of the market, and to lessons learnt.
Although this Advocacy Note only addresses the le-
gal regulation of cannabis markets due to the currency 
and urgency of ongoing debates around the world, the 
twenty principles for responsible legal regulation and the 
underlying values of social justice, inclusion and human 
rights, can and should be extended to any proposal for 
legally regulating other scheduled drugs, with the appro-
priate adjustments. The IDPC network looks forward to 
expanding and updating these principles in view of the 
new initiatives, research, and regulatory experiences that 
are for sure to come in the near future.
Executive summary
Credit: Kiril Ignatyev
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The last few years has seen the legal regulation of drugs 
evolve from a theoretical possibility into a genuine real-
ity. A growing number of diverse countries in all regions 
of the world have seen political initiatives, and in some 
cases legal changes, leading to the creation of regulat-
ed markets for the cultivation, sale or use of interna-
tionally scheduled drugs, from cannabis to coca leaf 
or psychedelics, for traditional, medical and adult-non 
medical use. This is now an irreversible trend. 
As the debate moves beyond the critique of failed drug 
policies towards the conceptualisation and implemen-
tation of legally regulated markets, it is crucial to set 
out a framework that centres human rights and ad-
vances social justice. For drug policy reform this work is 
now urgent as corporate interests take hold. The IDPC 
network has come together to begin to articulate a set 
of principles for this next phase of drug policy reform 
and seek to ensure that this hard-fought reality of legal 
regulation will contribute to reducing inequality rather 
than further entrenching it.
Since the beginning, cannabis has been at the heart of 
this discussion.  As of 2020, over fifty countries have 
moved to regulate the cultivation, production or sale 
of cannabis or cannabis derivates for medical purpos-
es, while a growing number of jurisdictions have es-
tablished legal frameworks for adult non-medical use, 
including for social, cultural and religious purposes. At 
the international plane, in 2019 the World Health Or-
ganisation presented a proposal for the rescheduling 
of cannabis and some components and derivates, 
thus acknowledging for the first time their therapeutic 
value, and the overstatement of their health-related 
harms under the international drug control system;1 
after several postponements, the recommendation 
is expected to be put to vote by the Commission on 
Narcotic Drugs in December 2020.  The questions 
surrounding the legal regulation of cannabis have be-
come central, and urgent.
Cannabis: a paradigmatic example of the 
origins and failures of prohibition
Since early history, cannabis has been used by com-
munities in the Global South for cultural, medicinal, 
and spiritual purposes -especially in the regions of the 
planet where the plant originates. Despite this long 
and rich history, the 1961 Single Convention sched-
uled cannabis as one of the most harmful and addic-
tive substances in the world with very limited thera-
peutic value,2 a decision rooted in colonial prejudices 
and racist hysteria that lacked any scientific basis.3 The 
main psychoactive component of cannabis, THC, was 
also scheduled in the 1971 Convention on Psychotro-
pic Substances. 
Cannabis is the most popular drug in the world, 
with over 192 million users globally or 3.9% of the 
total population aged 15 to 64.4 As such, cannabis 
exemplifies the abyssal failure of the prohibitionist 
approaches to drug use. With over 660,000 arrests 
for cannabis offences in 2018 in the United States of 
America (USA) alone,5 Cannabis also showcases the 
Cannabis fields in the Rif region of Morocco
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6harm, oppression and stigma brought by punitive 
policies on communities involved in the cultivation, 
sale and use of drugs–especially on the basis of race, 
gender identity, and sexual orientation. Exclusion 
and oppression also take place against communities 
that have traditionally cultivated and used canna-
bis in the Global South; for instance, approximately 
48,000 cannabis growers were facing arrest warrants 
in 2018 in Morocco alone.6
Legal regulation: a powerful tool for 
change, but not a silver bullet
Legal regulation can be a powerful tool to end and 
redress the harms arising from prohibition. Howev-
er, the creation of a legal market is not a silver bullet 
that will automatically address these issues by itself. 
Legal regulation is not a binary, black-and-white de-
velopment that has exclusively positive outcomes. 
Just as any other regulated market, from alcohol to 
pharmaceutical products, regulated drugs markets 
can fail to live up to values of inclusiveness, equi-
ty, and social justice. In some cases, legal markets 
can be captured by private interest, and can con-
tribute to the exclusion and further criminalisa-
tion of the communities historically involved in the 
informal market, who have also borne the brunt 
of prohibition.
When engaging with legal regulation debates, re-
form-minded organisation should bear in mind that 
regulation goes far beyond the mere legalisation of 
a substance. Regulatory frameworks are complex set 
of norms that define who can access the legal mar-
kets and in what conditions; they also establish the 
penalties –if any- for those operating outside legality. 
Because of this, regulations have consequential impli-
cations for the health, rights, livelihood and natural 
environment of the individuals and communities in-
volved in the cultivation, sale and use of the regulat-
ed substance; because drug markets are global, these 
implications will frequently reach beyond the country 
where regulation is enacted. 
This Advocacy Notes offers a comprehensive vision 
for upholding the core values of the IDPC network in 
a regulated framework. The 20 principles for the re-
sponsible legal regulation of cannabis are arranged 
around five clusters: protecting the health and rights 
of people who use drugs; advancing social justice; 
promoting fair, sustainable and equitable trade poli-
cies; reforming criminal justice responses to drug-re-
lated activities that remain illegal; and adopting a 
gender-sensitive approach. While the creation of reg-
ulated markets might require compromises on some 
of these counts, this Advocacy Note proposes a vision 
of how an ambitious regulatory framework would 
look like.
Debates around the legal regulation of cannabis 
are dominated by three key policy options that are 
frequently conflated, but have different meanings 
and implications – decriminalisation, legalisation, 
and regulation.  
• Decriminalisation means removing criminal 
penalties, such as prison, for certain drug ac-
tivities –normally personal drug use and ancil-
lary activities like possession and cultivation 
for personal use. Decriminalisation can and is 
frequently enacted independently from legali-
sation and legal regulation. Decriminalisation is 
a necessary step to end punitive drug policies, 
and to ensure access to health. As of today, ap-
proximately 30 countries have adopted some 
model of formal or informal decriminalisation 
of personal drug use and ancillary activities.
• Legalisation is the process of making cer-
tain drug activities – normally related to drug 
supply, such as production, cultivation and sale 
of drugs– legal. Legalisation is a one-off inter-
vention that does not describe how drug mar-
kets will operate once it has taken place. 
• Legal regulation refers to the framework of 
rules established by a state to control markets 
of risky legalised products and behaviours, from 
driving cars to alcohol or scheduled drugs. While 
legalisation highlights the novelty of creating a 
legal market for drugs, legal regulation empha-
sises that states have successfully engaged for 
centuries in the control of risky behaviours; in 
that regard, the difference between the legal 
regulation of tobacco and cannabis, or other 
scheduled drugs, is minimal. In opposition to 
legalisation, legal regulation is a continuous and 
iterative process that makes explicit the whole 
array of policy options available at the moment 
of creating a legal market for scheduled drugs.
Box 1  Glossary of key concepts around the legal regulation of 
cannabis
7Crafting the IDPC principles: a mem-
ber-led and iterative process
The IDPC principles for the responsible legal regula-
tion of cannabis responds to repeated demands from 
our membership to engage in this issue. The principles 
are the result of a member-led process that started 
with a first draft produced by several IDPC members 
from Latin America, and included the first ever glob-
al meeting of IDPC members focusing on one single 
policy topic. In that regard, this Advocacy Note is just 
the beginning of an ongoing and iterative process 
through which the IDPC network will reflect and work 
on the legal regulation of drugs. As new initiatives, 
evidence-based research, and regulatory experiences 
emerge and evolve, the principles will be updated to 
reflect the lessons learnt along the way. 
Crucially, while the principles are limited to canna-
bis due to the origins of the Advocacy Note and the 
currency and urgency of the cannabis debates, the 
underlying values of social justice, equity, and hu-
man rights should extend to the regulation of oth-
er scheduled drugs. Thus, the IDPC network looks 
forward to adapting these principles to other sub-
stances, integrating the knowledge and experience 
of the communities and organisations involved in 
these markets.
The over 195 members of the IDPC network operate 
in extremely diverse social, political, and legal con-
texts. Some members regard the public debate on 
regulation as timely and necessary, while others can 
see legal regulation as counterproductive to more 
immediate advocacy goals, such as harm reduction, 
decriminalisation or criminal justice reforms. For 
those who advocate legal regulation there is not one 
single regulatory model to adopt, as regulations need 
to respond to the realities of different societies and 
communities. To support and empower this diversity, 
the IDPC principles for legal regulation propose a co-
herent, but also versatile, vision of the values of the 
IDPC network in these debates.
Health and human rights of 
people who use drugs  
1  Use legal regulation to protect the 
rights of people who use drugs
When a legally regulated market is established, the 
relevant legal system should recognise and protect 
the rights of people who use cannabis, just as it does 
for any consumer of any other legal product that 
presents similar health risks. Unlike illegal markets, 
in which there are no guarantees of quality control, 
in a regulated system people who use drugs can be 
entitled to the full range of consumer rights and pro-
tections provided by the relevant jurisdiction. These 
include the right to receive complete information, 
with a labelling and packaging system that describes 
accurately the product, and the certainty that sanitary 
and other safety measures have been complied with 
during production.
Furthermore, the formalisation of cultivation, pro-
duction, and trade related activities under a legally 
Demonstration in favour of cannabis regulation in Uruguay
 Credit: G
onzalo G
. U
seta | Flickr - G
onzak | CC BY-N
C-N
D
 
8regulated market would contribute to reducing the 
stigma, discrimination, exclusion, and extortion that 
characterise illegal markets. This is of course very 
relevant to the right to health, as eliminating stig-
ma, discrimination, and the fear of criminalisation 
and judgement will facilitate access to information, 
voluntary treatment, and harm reduction. However, 
it also applies to a whole range of other rights, such 
as protection from extortion, labour laws, and access 
to justice, from which actors in the illegal market are 
normally barred. 
2 Protect public health and adopt a 
harm reduction approach
Protecting public health should be one of the main 
reasons for establishing legally regulated drug mar-
kets. The health of people who use drugs and the 
general population can be better protected with the 
creation of a legal framework guaranteeing safe ac-
cess to substances, health services to prevent harmful 
impacts, and accessible, comprehensive information. 
Furthermore, regulation allows for the introduction of 
safeguards to protect people for whom cannabis use 
poses supplementary health risks, such as children 
and other young people, and allows for the adoption 
of evidence-based safety regulations, such as drug 
driving tests that measure the impairment effects of 
cannabis, rather than just the presence of the drug.7 
The example of tobacco is particularly relevant. Be-
fore the adoption of the Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control and other recent market reforms,8 
smoke-free zones were not compulsory, second-hand 
smoking affected non-smokers; smokers did not ben-
efit from the same level of information that is now 
available on packaging, and the potential market 
seemed endless, with loosely-regulated advertising. 
Instead of prohibiting tobacco, in recent years coun-
tries have established increasingly stricter regulations 
to ensure that smokers use tobacco in an informed 
and responsible manner, and to protect the health of 
both non-smokers and potential smokers. 
In that sense, regulated drug markets are in them-
selves a harm reduction mechanism. They can protect 
people who decide to use a substance, create meas-
ures that would make use safer by limiting impacts on 
individual and public health, provide evidence-based 
information, and facilitate the implementation of spe-
cific harm reduction measures. These measures could 
include limits to the potency of substances, tracea-
bility measures to ensure quality standards for prod-
ucts, compulsory labelling with detailed information 
on each product, and information campaigns on use 
(which could include the effects of the use of different 
products and forms of intake), amongst others.
Regulation can also create safer alternatives to illegal 
markets dominated by products of unpredictable con-
tent and high toxicity. In North America, the ‘contam-
ination’ of the opioid supply with high-potency syn-
thetic opioids has been directly linked to a sharp, tragic 
and continued rise in overdose fatalities.9 Community 
mobilisation has sounded the alarm and led calls for 
non-commercial models of legal access, such as heroin 
compassion clubs and prescription vending machines. 
These models would ensure access to pharmaceu-
tic-grade opioids for people at high risk of death by 
overdose, thus reducing the use of adulterated opioids. 
3. Promote individual autonomy, liberty, 
and privacy
In a state governed by the rule of law, the autonomy 
of each individual is protected, and any interference 
from the state needs to be fully justified. This pro-
tection bestows upon individuals a number of rights, 
ensuring that each person is able to make decisions 
about their own life. Generally, these freedoms are 
limited by the rights of others or the protection of 
public goods. In the case of drug use, various ar-
guments have been used to justify government in-
terventions through prohibitionist and repressive 
measures.10 However, in recent years, various gov-
ernments around the world11 have questioned these 
justifications, concluding that prohibition is an ex-
cessive measure that violates individual freedoms, 
and ultimately people’s autonomy.
In countries such as Mexico and South Africa, var-
ious court decisions recognising the unconstitu-
tionality of cannabis prohibition were constructed 
around the rights that protect the individual sphere. 
Within the frame of protecting individual freedoms, 
dignity has been recognised as the normative basis 
for protecting an individual’s right to use drugs and 
activities associated with drug use, within certain 
limits. Various rights stem from the concept of digni-
ty, including the right to privacy, self-determination, 
and the right to the free development of personality. 
State interference should therefore find a balance 
between establishing the least restrictive limits pos-
sible for individual autonomy, and prevent possible 
intrusions outside of that individual sphere. In the 
case of legally regulated cannabis markets, the regu-
latory measures are justified by the possible impacts 
on the rights of other individuals, public order, and 
public health.
To ensure that both elements – autonomy and rights, 
versus limiting those rights – are protected, govern-
ments have various regulatory tools at their dispos-
al,12 as well as a number of guidelines established in 
international treaties, especially in the area of human 
9rights. With regard to health, most countries in the 
world have signed on to international treaties which 
protect, respect, guarantee, and promote this right. 
Therefore, any government regulation should abide by 
these rules and establish regulated markets that are 
more or less restrictive (for instance on price, availa-
bility, and marketing), as is the case for substances like 
tobacco, alcohol, and medicines.
To protect privacy, regulatory frameworks should 
avoid establishing a registry of people who use 
drugs, as the current legislation in Uruguay, and 
some legislative proposals in Mexico, do.13 A registry 
of users, be it compulsory or voluntary, is an unnec-
essary restriction of the right to privacy that does 
not exist in other legal drug markets – such as cof-
fee, tobacco, or alcohol – and that can have harm-
ful effects: from acting as a barrier to entering the 
legal market to perpetuating stigma, discrimination, 
and inequality.14
4 Create accessible and needs-based 
legal markets
To fully protect the rights and health of people who 
use drugs and mitigate the harms caused by prohibi-
tion, regulated markets need to be viable, accessible 
alternatives to the illegal market, while preserving ap-
propriate regulations and health safeguards. If this is 
not the case, illegal markets may continue to thrive af-
ter legal regulation – as they are to a certain degree in 
Canada.15 While illegal markets will inevitably appear 
in any scenario, legal regulation loses a significant 
part of its potential as a mechanism for redressing 
the harms of prohibition, criminalisation, and stigma, 
when illegal markets remain large.
Some of the factors that might have slowed user buy-in 
for the Canadian legal market are an insufficient num-
ber of retail stores in some provinces, due to complex 
approval processes;16 lack of good-quality products in 
comparison with the illegal market;17 production and 
supply bottlenecks;18 and higher prices than the illegal 
market.19  On the other hand, this trend might also be 
driven by the simple fact that consumers are satisfied 
with their existing illegal supply.20
When attempting to design an attractive legal mar-
ket, policy-makers need to strike a balance between 
facilitating access to the market and protecting pub-
lic health,21 and should avoid loosening regulations 
excessively to the detriment of the latter. As the cas-
es of Uruguay and Canada show, a fully-regulated, 
functional retail market is a complex environment 
that takes time to establish,22 especially when there 
is already a robust illegal space. Though in a very dif-
ferent setting, in the state of Oregon (USA), initial-
ly high prices in the legal market have reduced to a 
Even in countries that have regulated cannabis for 
medical use, patients can face serious barriers to 
accessing cannabis-based products for medicinal 
purposes (commonly known as ‘CBMPs’), as their 
availability is in many cases restricted. Given that 
cannabis has been recognised to have potential 
therapeutic value for neurological diseases such as 
multiple sclerosis or epilepsy, amongst many oth-
ers,25 this restriction can impinge on the enjoyment 
of the right to health, which includes access to con-
trolled medicines.26 
Under these restrictions, the demand for CBMPs 
greatly outstrips the supply.27 Therefore, policy-
makers that want to ensure that people do not 
resort to the illegal market should address the fol-
lowing areas of concern:
  The overall lack of approved CBMPs, which is 
due to the dearth of clinical trial data on the ef-
fects of cannabis, caused by the historical obsta-
cles of conducting clinical trials with cannabis.28 
In fact, studies shows that more funding is allo-
cated to researching cannabis’ harmful effects 
than its potential therapeutic value.29
  Even where CBMPs have been approved and 
exist in the market, some practitioners are re-
luctant to prescribe them, as they lack the spe-
cialised knowledge to make fully informed pre-
scribing decisions.31, 31 
  Even where CBMPs exist in the market and can 
be prescribed, they can be prohibitively expen-
sive. In the United Kingdom, parents of children 
with epilepsy have reported that they are un-
able to afford the cost of Full Extract Cannabis 
Oil, while the medicine is not available through 
public channels.32
  In some countries like Argentina, Colombia, and 
Mexico, detailed regulatory frameworks for the 
introduction of CBMPs in the market are signif-
icantly delayed, even after the adoption of laws 
regulating medical cannabis.33
Box 2  Challenges in accessing medical cannabis in regulated  
markets
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more sustainable level through increased competi-
tion, contributing to the waning of the illegal sector.23 
Beyond price, legally regulated markets can also be 
designed so that they can add value for consumers in 
comparison to illegal markets– such as guarantees of 
consistency, safety, and quality; a wider range of prod-
ucts available; geographical indications; and a friendly 
venue in which to use -as evidenced by Dutch “coffee 
shops”).24 Online sales should be allowed to ensure 
access to the legal market for people with reduced 
mobility, or in geographical isolation.
Social justice
Whereas access to justice in its most traditional sense 
tends to focus on an individual level, social justice 
seeks to better distribute fundamental rights and re-
sponsibilities across communities, and mandates in-
stitutions to address the structural inequalities gener-
ated by various factors. In commercial markets, there 
is a clear tension between the goal of using regulation 
to promote social inclusion and the interests of large 
corporations, which seek to achieve minimal regulato-
ry constraints, low tax rates, protection against com-
petition, and the maximisation of profits.34 As a result, 
many policy discussions around legal regulation have 
increasingly focused on how to integrate social justice 
mechanisms rather than simply moving towards reg-
ulation at any cost. A social justice framework around 
cannabis regulation would recognise historically mar-
ginalised and oppressed groups, often on the basis 
of race, gender identity or sexual orientation, and 
would generate reparation, redress and affirmative 
action initiatives, from the inclusion of small and me-
dium-scale farmers within the regulated markets, to 
the release and expungement of criminal records for 
people imprisoned for cannabis-related offences. 
5 Involve affected communities in the 
policy-making process
The conceptualisation, development, implementation 
and evaluation of drug policies need to abide by the 
democratic imperative of participation and social in-
clusion. People who are currently involved in illegal 
markets, including growers and people who use drugs, 
as well as experts from academia and civil society, 
have a wealth of experience and knowledge that pol-
icy makers cannot afford to side-line. In some cases, 
communities have developed codes of good practice 
that function as proto-regulatory frameworks. These 
can, and should, inform nascent legal systems.35 
Moreover, people already involved in illegal markets, 
from cultivators to transporters and sellers, can shed 
light on the potential administrative, regulatory, finan-
cial, and socio-cultural barriers that might create ob-
stacles to formalisation. For instance, by engaging with 
traditional cannabis growers through consultations and 
long-term partnerships based on mutual respect, deci-
sion makers can develop schemes that ensure smooth-
er transitions to formality and encourage a sense of 
ownership that increases the probability of participa-
tion and compliance. The Bolivian model of coca ‘social 
control’ offers an illuminating example in this regard.36
Credit: osw
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aldo | CC BY 2.0
The Mexican army eridacting illegal crops in 2003
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Cannabis markets throughout the supply chain are 
very diverse, and involve many different communities. 
When designing the regulatory process for a particu-
lar market, policy makers should carry out an assess-
ment of the communities involved and establish cred-
ible mechanisms to reach out and engage with formal 
or informal community-led organisations, ensuring 
that as many voices as possible are represented.  This 
process is also an opportunity to increase public and 
political awareness of the experiences of people that 
have been involved in the illegal market for decades, 
thereby reducing misinformation and stigma.
6 Ensure that actors involved in the 
informal markets can transition into 
legality
The regulation of historically illegal drugs can result 
in the creation of new legal markets that co-exist side 
by side with the old illegal markets, but that are pop-
ulated by new actors that are not representative of 
the communities affected by prohibition. This has cer-
tainly been the case of most states in the USA that 
regulated cannabis for adult non-medical use, as 
white people own from 80% to 90% of the multi-bil-
lion cannabis industry, while people of colour remain 
in informal and criminalised spaces.37 In Colombia, an 
estimated 70% of the cannabis cultivation companies 
are controlled by foreign investors.38  
To respond to basic values of fairness and justice, reg-
ulatory frameworks should be designed to avoid this 
outcome, by actively facilitating transitions into the 
legal market for people and communities involved in 
and affected by the illegal drug trade.39 This principle 
should extend to actors involved in all segments of the 
drug economy, from people who cultivate to those 
who transport and sell drugs.
In that regard, the obligations of policy-makers are two-
fold. First, legal regulation frameworks should make 
sure that prior involvement in any illegal drug activity 
is not by itself a legal or administrative barrier to be an 
actor in the legal market. Thus, policy-makers should 
provide for automatic expungement provisions that 
fully erase criminal records for some people convicted 
for offences related to the legalised substance,40 and 
consider adopting amnesties for those still serving their 
punishment.41 (In contrast with this, Canadian legisla-
tors opted for the sealing of criminal records, which 
differs from expungement in that it still enables some 
public officials to consult the records). Regulations that 
automatically bar all people with a prior drug convic-
tion from entering  the market must be avoided.
Secondly, authorities should proactively support peo-
ple who wish to engage in the process of formalisation, 
as the economic, technical, bureaucratic, language, cul-
tural, and knowledge barriers to entering the market 
can be formidable. This can be done through a wide va-
riety of mechanisms, from affirmative action creating 
preferential access to licenses or easing technical re-
quirements for members of affected communities,42 to 
establishing an obligation for corporations to facilitate 
knowledge transfer to communities.43 States should 
also provide financial support to people from affected 
Credit: Ernestien Jensem
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communities, for instance through the waiver of li-
cense fees and through loans, as does Illinois, USA.44 
7 Prioritise the participation of small- 
and medium-scale cultivating com-
munities 
The historical marginalisation and criminalisation of 
communities cultivating crops destined for the illegal 
drug market are well documented. These communi-
ties have been affected by forced crop eradication 
perpetrated primarily by militarised forces, while at 
the same time commonly extorted by criminal groups 
threatening their safety if they refuse to cultivate or 
accept the price offered to them (which is generally 
low).45 Both experiences often result in the forced 
displacement of cultivating communities46 either to 
urban environments or to more remote rural areas, 
further away from public services.  
Cannabis regulation with a social justice focus requires 
the provision of adequate and sustainable livelihoods 
for these communities. Regulations should develop 
mechanisms to ensure that they can actively partici-
pate in the market, with a fairer distribution of resourc-
es along the production chain, as well as land redistri-
bution and agrarian reforms when necessary, and to 
make sure that the interests of large corporations do 
not undermine those of small- and medium-scale culti-
vators. State intervention is therefore essential.
Several jurisdictions have adopted policies that prior-
itise the participation of small/medium-scale or tra-
ditional cannabis cultivators into the newly regulated 
market – with varied results. Jamaica has attempted 
to place a focus on incorporating traditional farmers 
into the emerging medicinal cannabis market; this has 
taken the form of partnerships between traditional 
growers (or cooperatives) and investors from coun-
tries with more developed cannabis industries such 
as Canada.47 While these deals are hailed as a positive 
outcome for both parties, it remains to be seen how 
revenues are distributed and whether this marks a 
true and long-term investment in traditional farmers. 
Another example is Colombia, where regulations re-
quire that cannabis companies purchase 10% of their 
raw material from small- or medium-sized cultivating 
communities, defined as those holding less than half a 
hectare (or an acre).48 However, this approach has not 
delivered the expected outcome either (see Box 3).
Other jurisdictions have defined emerging cannabis 
markets as ‘strategic’ or ‘priority’ areas that require 
special treatment. For example, civil society groups in 
Mexico have proposed that, under a regulated canna-
bis market, cultivation and harvesting permits should 
be exclusively granted to communities identified as 
pertaining to the social sector (ejidos,49 communal 
properties, cooperatives, and small land owners).50 
Should this type of mechanism be enforced, compa-
nies that enter the market at other points of the pro-
duction chain would have to purchase raw material at 
A significant risk to the participation of cultivating 
communities in newly regulated markets is the in-
flow of investors from abroad –typically from the 
Global North–, with the economic, technological, 
and knowledge resources necessary to push tra-
ditional growers out of the market.
Because Canada has been the first large-scale 
market to regulate cannabis for both medical 
and non-medical uses, Canadian corporations 
have positioned themselves as lead global in-
vestors, intervening in medical and non-medical 
markets as diverse as Colombia, France, Mexico, 
or the United States (USA).51  In Latin America, 
Canadian companies have been estimated to 
control over 70% of both the Colombian52 and 
the Uruguayan53 markets.
In order to prevent precisely this from hap-
pening, the Colombian legislation had required 
that a percentage of all licences for cultivating 
cannabis for medical purposes was granted to 
traditional or small/medium-scale cultivators. 
However, this policy has not had the desired ef-
fect. Instead of investing in communities so that 
they can cultivate at the level of quality required 
by building their capacity through exchanging 
knowledge or sharing seed varieties, companies 
simply purchase the amount required and dis-
pose of it.54 By doing so, they still comply with 
their legal obligations, but avoid any meaningful 
partnership with small-scale cultivators.  
To tackle this problem, some states might con-
sider establishing restrictions on foreign invest-
ment in the companies operating in the legal 
cannabis market.55 However, policymakers that 
want to establish such a restriction should reflect 
on how it can be compatible with -or established 
as an exception to- principles of non-discrim-
ination against foreign actors in certain inter-
national trade agreements, which can protect 
the access to Global South markets by investors 
from abroad. 
Box 3  International market 
capture: Canadian corporations 
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a fair price from the cultivating communities. 
When well implemented, these policy options can help 
reduce the risks of corporate capture of the market. 
Additional measures include improved access to state 
programmes for cultivating communities, providing 
economic support to increase their production capaci-
ty and quality, capacity building to ensure that they are 
able to navigate the regulatory structures and licensing 
system, tax incentives and other economic stimulus for 
production, as well as better access to services such as 
public healthcare, schools, and security.
8 Develop reparation, satisfaction and 
non-repetition measures to address 
the impact of prohibition
Considering the costs of prohibition under a human 
rights lens implies introducing the concept of compre-
hensive reparation towards the victims of prohibition, 
both individually and collectively, in regulatory frame-
works. The comprehensive character of reparation 
includes restoring the rights that have been violated 
and, if this is not possible, applying compensation, sat-
isfaction and non-repetition measures.61
In the context of human rights violations resulting from 
prohibitionist drug policies, designing and implement-
ing a policy for the responsible regulation of drugs 
constitutes a guarantee of no repetition: a legal market 
reduces the punitive focus of the state on people in-
volved in drug cultivation, production, traffic, and use. 
Within the regulatory framework, satisfaction meas-
ures could include the allocation of resources collected 
through the tax system towards institutions or public 
policies that benefit both those who were unjustly in-
carcerated for drug offences, and victims and families 
of victims of serious human rights violations caused 
by repressive drug policies. This could take the form 
of social reintegration programmes, or, in countries 
where this would be applicable, searching for people 
who have disappeared as a result of the war on drugs 
and compensating their families, amongst others. In 
some contexts, reparation measures should also in-
clude protecting, promoting, and raising awareness 
on traditional, cultural, and sacramental drug uses 
that predate colonialism.
9 Protect the traditional, cultural, 
medicinal, and sacramental uses of 
cannabis
For centuries, cannabis has been used for cultural, 
religious, and medicinal purposes, especially in the 
regions of the planet where the plant originates. Can-
nabis has been traditionally used for its therapeutic 
properties in Asia, and from there spreading to the 
Middle East, Africa, and Western countries; 62  for reli-
gious and sacramental ends by the Hindu, Rastafarian, 
and Sufi communities; and for social and recreation-
al purposes in the Mediterranean, amongst others. 
A regulatory framework that seeks to advance social 
justice must create spaces for the preservation and 
flourishing of these practices.
With few exceptions, most traditional uses were 
banned – or were mandated to phase out– under 
the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs,63 a 
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provision with clear colonial roots that is in clear con-
tradiction with the 2007 United Nations Declarations 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which recognises 
indigenous people’s right to maintain their traditional 
medicines and cultural heritage.64 However, countries 
like India, Pakistan, Morocco, or even Egypt, have re-
sorted to different means of informal non-enforce-
ment regarding their harsh drug laws against tradi-
tional uses -at least in part.65 
In order to address this, regulatory frameworks should 
recognise traditional uses of cannabis as part of their 
cultural heritage, as the Bolivian constitution does for 
the coca leaf,66 and allow for traditional communities 
to cultivate and use cannabis for sacramental purpos-
es, as Jamaica did for the Rastafarian community in its 
2015 drug law reform.67 Regulations should also rec-
ognise the therapeutic value of herbal and traditional 
preparations made on the basis of cannabis,68 in line 
with the WHO’s efforts to foster the integration of tra-
ditional medicine.69 In all cases, preserving traditional 
uses means creating the conditions for the relevant 
communities to operate within the legal frameworks, 
through affirmative action as well as technical and fi-
nancial support.
Inclusive and equitable trade 
policies throughout global supply 
chains
The development of legally regulated markets does 
not take place in a vacuum. Decision-makers can 
leverage this opportunity to favour the formalisa-
tion of existing economies and the emergence of 
business and trade models that promote a more eq-
uitable distribution of value along the supply chain. 
In this way, legally regulated markets can contribute 
Patio of the prison El Inca 
In the USA, Afro-American and Latino commu-
nities have been disproportionately impacted 
by repressive drug policies56 and some emerg-
ing legal cannabis markets have sought to re-
vert those harms through various policy op-
tions. The Cannabis Control Commission of the 
state of Massachusetts defined a set of criteria 
to participate in the ‘Social Equity Program’, in-
cluding being a resident for the past five to 10 
years of specific zones that have been dispro-
portionately impacted; being a Massachusetts 
resident and having received a drug conviction 
in the past 12 months; or being married to or 
being the child of someone convicted of a drug 
offence in the past 12 months. 
In this way, the Commission identified the most 
marginalised communities and established af-
firmative and reparative actions that seek to 
encourage and support their participation in 
the now legal cannabis market. The goals of 
the ‘Social Equity Program’ include support to 
these groups to reduce barriers to entry; pro-
vide training, technical services, and mento-
ring; and promote “economically reparative 
practices”.57 Oklahoma is also an interesting 
example, with the creation of ‘low-thresh-
old’ licencing schemes to ensure that people 
from poorer backgrounds have access to the 
legal market.58
Box 4  Reparation in action: 
Massachusetts’ Social Equity 
Program
 
Various communities have been affected differ-
ently by prohibitionist drug policies, depending 
on the jurisdiction’s legal framework and how 
punitive policies have been implemented. Regu-
lating cannabis through a legal framework does 
not only offer the possibility of accepting its 
use and marketing. It is an opportunity to make 
amends for the harms caused by decades of re-
pressive drug policies on populations suffering 
from inequality. Various reparation measures 
can be applied in support of affected people. In 
the case of restitution measures, prison release 
through amnesties or preferential treatment in 
the criminal justice system ensures that groups 
in situation of vulnerability can gain their free-
dom. Social reintegration processes in favour of 
the beneficiaries, as well as measures such as 
the expungement of criminal records in specific 
cases, are equally important.59
For instance, the Californian legislation incorpo-
rates various reparation measures which include 
the expungement of criminal records or the 
elimination of penalties for people condemned 
for cannabis-related offences.60 In addition, the 
legislation called for the investment of at least 
USD 50 million per year in community reinte-
gration projects, starting with USD 10 million in 
2018 and increasing by an additional USD 10 mil-
lion each year until stabilising on the fifth year 
(2022).
Box 5  Redressing the harms  
of criminalisation
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to, rather than undermine, progress towards the Sus-
tainable Development Goals (SDGs),70 both nationally 
and internationally. 
10 Prioritise inclusive business models 
that focus on the least privileged
The emergence of a multi-billion dollar cannabis in-
dustry dominated by large corporations poses signif-
icant challenges to public health, governance, and 
sustainability. Lessons from the alcohol and tobac-
co industries offer stark warnings against regulatory 
capture by private interests. With this in mind, a sus-
tainable cannabis industry requires not only to adopt 
product and trading controls that limit the potentially 
negative impact on the health and wellbeing of con-
sumers, but also favour the distribution of power and 
value across the supply chain. So far, projects in ‘alter-
native development’ for cannabis growers have been 
largely unsuccessful in doing so.76  
Policy-makers designing regulated drug markets have 
a wide range of tools to control the harms of corporate 
influence. These measures range from government 
monopolies to fair trade schemes, cooperative associ-
ation models, or tax justice measures that ensure that 
corporations pay their fair share of taxes where they 
operate, instead of syphoning them to tax havens. On 
the supply side, inclusive business models take dif-
ferent forms but tend to take the shape of growers’ 
associations or agricultural cooperatives, owned and 
governed by growers themselves. These structures al-
low growers to collectivise resources, risks, and bene-
fits, thus lowering market entry barriers (for instance, 
by facilitating the navigation of complex normative 
frameworks), boosting resilience and maximising ne-
gotiating power.77 
The success of these initiatives will largely depend on 
state authorities’ commitment to embedding the for-
malisation of cannabis markets in a broader strategy of 
sustainable development, and on whether local laws 
and policies facilitate the formation and functioning 
of organisations like unions or cooperatives. As such, 
ensuring the meaningful participation of growers in a 
legally regulated market will require facilitating access 
to markets by investing in adequate infrastructure, 
credit facilities, and technical assistance. 
11 Uphold workers’ rights and promote 
fair labour practices 
Illegal economic sectors can be a hostile environment 
for workers’ rights, as employees frequently live in sit-
uations of vulnerability, and employers are subject to 
no regulation.78 For example, forced labour has been 
abundantly reported by human trafficking survivors 
working in illegal cannabis growing sites in countries 
such as Ireland and the United Kingdom,79 while seri-
ous abuse and exploitation are often found in planta-
tions of illegal crops in countries such as Brazil.80  
The legal regulation of markets can contribute to bet-
ter working conditions, as it provides the opportunity 
for formalised, enforceable legal rights and oversight 
mechanisms. However, legal regulation by itself does 
not guarantee that labour rights will be upheld. Even 
in countries with relatively strong labour laws and 
guarantees, such as Spain81 or Italy,82 a wide range of 
labour rights violations are frequently recorded in the 
legal agricultural sector – from the denial of minimum 
wage to a lack of access to basic services and modern 
slavery, in great part due to informal and temporary 
employment practices.83 Similarly, there have been 
some reports of labour rights violations in legal can-
nabis farms in the USA.84
Legal regulations need to address this reality. For do-
mestic industries, legal regulations should include 
measures that strengthen and enforce existing worker 
rights, taking into account the track record of abuse 
and power imbalance between employers and work-
ers in the agricultural sector. For instance, several 
states in the USA have included ‘labour peace agree-
ments’ in their cannabis regulations,85 which means 
that employers are required to facilitate the unioni-
sation of their workforce.86 In the legal cannabis mar-
kets where international trade is possible, regulations 
should promote fair labour practices by supporting 
Cannabis social clubs stand out as an interest-
ing alternative business model for both supply 
and demand markets. Cannabis social clubs are 
non-profit associations of adult cannabis users 
that collectively produce and distribute canna-
bis amongst themselves.71  Grounded in Span-
ish grassroots activism and counterculture, 
these organisations were conceived to organise 
shared consumption and cultivation in a private 
place, and only on a non-profit basis.72 Though 
for-profit variants have appeared in certain con-
texts (normally in contravention of the law),73 
this has been a successful alternative to the can-
nabis industry that has existed for more than 
twenty years. At the moment there are hun-
dreds of cannabis social clubs in at least thirteen 
European countries, sometimes with as many as 
5,000 members,74 and they are one of the legal 
avenues for acquiring cannabis in Uruguay.75
Box 6  Cannabis social clubs: 
from grassroots movement to 
alternative business model
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and facilitating initiatives such as worker-driven social 
responsibility, which aim to transfer power to work-
ers in exploitative industries throughout the global 
supply chain.87
12 Maximise value and protect rights 
across the supply chain through 
certification schemes
The participation and competitiveness of cannabis 
products from smaller growers could be bolstered by 
schemes that highlight sustainable and rights-com-
pliant production standards (i.e. energy efficiency, 
labour protection, gender equity, etc.), and that lever-
age local value. While existing schemes proposed 
within the frame of the “Fair Trade Movement”88 offer 
an interesting blueprint, state authorities could proac-
tively work with producers to favour the development 
of innovative certification schemes. 
Anchored in ‘peer review, mutual trust and produc-
er empowerment’,89 participatory guarantee systems 
(PGS) are quality assurance systems that certify pro-
ducers on the basis of stakeholder participation. They 
offer the benefit of flexibility, community-orientation 
and local focus, contrary to third party certification 
schemes that might not be accessible for smaller 
growing communities due to capacity limitations (e.g. 
onerous audit processes) and the continued stigma 
associated with the illegal drugs market. PGS can 
also operate as a mechanism to promote fair labour 
practices across different countries, including in juris-
dictions and sector where labour rights and their en-
forcement have been historically weak.
Smaller producers could also be supported in le-
veraging and deriving value from the uniqueness of 
their products and their conditions of production. 
In California (USA), for instance, the state govern-
ment sponsors the CalCannabis Appellations Project, 
which seeks to develop a framework for a state-wide 
appellation system in collaboration with growing 
communities to ‘promote regional products and 
local businesses’.90 An appellation system is a geo-
graphical indication that identifies products coming 
from a certain region and/or produced following cer-
tain parameters, and certifies them in a recognisable 
way for consumers.91 
13 Address the challenges to 
international trade posed by the 
global drug control regime 
The international prohibition of scheduled drugs for 
non-medical and non-scientific use introduced by the 
global drug conventions, the almost universal ratifica-
tion of these treaties, and a pervasive resistance to 
change within the multilateral system pose significant 
challenges for the establishment of conditions that 
support sustainable and equitable regional and global 
trade of cannabis. 
One key obstacle concerns access to banking and oth-
er financial services, which is crucial to reduce mar-
ket entry barriers for smaller businesses with limited 
capital. In the USA, for instance, the federal prohibi-
tion of cannabis has made it virtually impossible for 
smaller businesses at the State level to access such 
services, forcing them instead to ‘operate as “cash 
Farmers drying the cannabis harvest in the Rif region of Morocco
Credit: D
ania Putri
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only”, increasing security risks and operating costs’.92 
Even in countries that have implemented nationwide 
regulations, such as Uruguay, banking multinationals 
(and national operators that depend on them) have 
alluded to international anti-money laundering regu-
lations to refuse service to legal cannabis businesses 
– a contradiction in terms, according to local author-
ities.93 Therefore, cannabis legal regulation initiatives 
should include domestic strategies that pre-empt 
potential obstacles to access financial services by 
market actors.94
International prohibition also hinders transnational 
trade, limiting the development potential that nascent 
markets could suppose for growing communities and 
potentially entrenching global inequalities. The devel-
opment of legally regulated markets in countries that 
have provided an outlet for cannabis products from 
poorer growing communities abroad will certainly dis-
rupt supply chains in ways that could prove deleterious 
for those communities.95 For many traditional growing 
communities, cannabis represents an important cash 
crop, offering a safety net from state neglect and lack of 
alternative livelihoods.96 For wealthier countries devel-
oping legally regulated markets, international solidarity 
and a commitment to sustainable and equitable trade 
should translate into the development of strategies97 
that seek to remove barriers within the UN drug control 
conventions that impede transnational cannabis trade, 
while protecting traditional growers from the inflow of 
foreign capital. This new context would pave the way 
for the deployment of strategies such as preferential ar-
rangements to favour market access for products from 
growing communities in developing countries.
14 Protect the climate and promote 
environmentally sustainable practices
Cannabis is a water-hungry, nutrient-intensive crop, 
and its large-scale commercial cultivation can result 
in environmental harm. In climates that allow for the 
outdoor cultivation of cannabis, this harm can mani-
fest through the clearing of wild lands, the diversion 
and intensive use of water, waste disposal, and agro-
chemical pollution such as pesticides, poisoning wild-
life and contaminating watersheds.98 When it comes 
to the indoor cultivation of cannabis, cultivation fa-
cilities engage in highly intensive energy use, thus 
creating a disproportionate carbon footprint. In that 
regard, it has been estimated that the power density 
of indoors cultivation facilities is equal to that of data 
centres;99 in 2012 alone, the energy consumed by can-
nabis cultivators in the USA was estimated to amount 
to a 1% of the total national electricity use.100 
Studies have found that, unless a formalised legal 
market is put in place, growers are unlikely to follow 
environmental regulations, while public officials can 
be inconsistent in enforcing environmental norms on 
illegal or semi-legal plantations.101 Therefore, legal 
regulation is essential to establish and enforce envi-
ronmental standards that are unlikely to exist outside 
a formalised framework.102  Furthermore, indoors cul-
tivation is driven, at least in part, by the need to hide 
away from law enforcement, and would be far less 
prevalent in legally regulated markets, thus bringing 
down the carbon footprint of the industry. 103
That said, the creation of regulated markets also has 
the potential to increase the scale of production, thus 
driving more environmental harm.104 (For instance, 
the total area under cultivation in California was es-
The growing momentum for the legal regulation 
of cannabis markets for adult non-medical use 
has intensified the existing tensions within the 
international drug control regime, as the regula-
tion of cannabis is not permitted under the UN 
framework. Acknowledging that it is unlikely that 
UN member states will agree to modify the exist-
ing conventions by consensus, some authors are 
proposing the figure of an inter se modification 
of the UN drug treaties by countries that have 
regulated non-medical cannabis domestically. 
An inter se modification is an agreement be-
tween several like-minded parties within a mul-
tilateral treaty, through which they modify their 
common understanding of certain sections of 
such treaty, with effects between themselves 
only. In the case of cannabis, this would mean 
creating a special regime that would align the 
existing domestic legally regulated markets with 
international law. In doing so, an inter se modi-
fication might permit international trade in can-
nabis amongst signatories of the modification, 
thus allowing small and medium-scale cultiva-
tors from the Global South to access the mar-
kets for non-medical adult use in Global North 
countries, from which they are currently barred.
For more information see: Jelsma, M. et al. 
(2018), Balancing treaty stability and change: In-
ter se modification of the UN drug conventions 
to facilitate cannabis regulation (Washington 
Office on Latin America, Transnational Institute, 
and the Global Drug Policy Observatory). Avail-
able at: https://www.wola.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2018/04/FINAL_Updated.pdf
Box 7  An inter se modification 
of the UN drug conventions to 
facilitate international trade
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timated to have increased by 91% between 2012 
and 2016 alone).105 Furthermore, in some cases cul-
tivation takes place in areas that are environmental-
ly fragile, like the Rif in Morocco.106 Because of this, 
new legal frameworks should not only include strong 
regulations to protect environmental resources from 
the harms associated with the cultivation of cannabis, 
but also provide financial resources to producers that 
want to transition into sustainable practices.107
Schemes that identify and promote environmentally 
sustainable practices are especially important, as they 
could contribute to extending these practices across 
regional and global supply chains, including in culti-
vating countries where environmental regulations can 
be lighter. However, in the past producers have faced 
barriers in accessing existing ecolabeling schemes, as 
these do not want to be associated with the canna-
bis industry.108 A responsible regulatory framework 
would seek to address this problem by facilitating 
certifications that allow engagement with consumers 
interested in environmentally sustainable standards 
and good agricultural practices led by small and medi-
um-scale producers.
Legal responses to drug activities 
outside the regulated market
15 End all punishments for offences re-
lating to personal drug use
For decades, activities related to personal drug use 
have been severely criminalised and punished across 
the world. At a global level, it is estimated that one 
in five people are incarcerated for drug offences, of 
whom 21% are in prison only for possession for per-
sonal use.109 The criminalisation of personal drug use 
and possession for personal use is a global phenome-
non - In Argentina, possession for personal use is pun-
ished with penalties ranging from one to six years in 
prison; in Mexico this can reach 10 months to three 
years;110 in Japan the sanction for possession can go 
up to five years;111 and in Nigeria it can range between 
15 and 25 years.112 Even where legislation does not 
criminalise possession for personal use, in practice 
the police continues to arrest people who use drugs 
– for example, in Costa Rica, Mexico and Russia.113 
Other countries, though they have removed drug 
use and ancillary activities from the criminal books, 
still retain administrative punishments that are puni-
tive in nature, such as fines (with imprisonment for 
non-payment), and administrative detention centres 
masquerading as treatment programmes.
This is especially troubling given that people living in 
poverty, homelessness, and oppression on the basis 
of race, ethnicity or gender identity and sexual orien-
tation, amongst many other factors, experience dis-
crimination at every stage of the criminal justice pro-
cess, and are more likely to be stopped, arrested, and 
sentenced for drug offences.114
Legally regulated markets would address the ongoing 
criminalisation of people who use cannabis by allow-
ing them to obtain and use the plant legally. Howev-
er, even with a regulated market in place, some be-
haviours and activities related to cannabis use could 
continue to be a criminal offence, such as the posses-
sion of cannabis obtained in the illegal market, the 
use of cannabis in public spaces, or the possession or 
use of drugs by young people, among others. In ad-
dition to that, the personal use of substances other 
than cannabis can continue to be criminalised, with 
Patio of the prison El Inca in Quito, Ecuador
Credit: Cesar A
cuña
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disastrous consequences. It is therefore essential that 
legal regulation is accompanied by the total decrim-
inalisation of personal drug use, possession for per-
sonal use, and ancillary activities, from cultivation to 
consumption, for any illegal substance. 
Such an approach would avoid perpetuating the 
harms associated with prohibition, especially for the 
communities that have traditionally been dispropor-
tionately impacted by punitive drug policies. A sa-
lient example here is the District of Columbia (USA). 
When the District of Columbia legalised cannabis in 
2015, smoking cannabis outdoors remained a crim-
inal offence. This effectively led to an increase in 
the criminalisation of those living in public housing 
where smoking indoors is prohibited, with black resi-
dents being disproportionately punished.118 Positive-
ly, other jurisdictions in the USA, including Alaska, 
California, Colorado and others have decriminalised 
various cannabis use activities even when they take 
place outside the regulated market,119 while in Uru-
guay the possession of any drug for personal use is 
decriminalised.120
16 Ensure that criminal justice responses 
to other drug-related activities are 
strictly proportionate
One of the key expected outcomes of legal regula-
tion is a reduction in the number of people entering 
the criminal justice system for offences associated 
with the illegal market, as a result of bringing those 
activities within a legal framework. Nevertheless, 
many drug-related activities such as drug trafficking 
are likely to remain within the sphere of the criminal 
justice system, not least all activities associated with 
substances other than cannabis. For this reason, it is 
critical that a broader review of drug laws is conduct-
ed to consider the decriminalisation of low-level drug 
offenses, and in all cases to ensure more proportion-
ate penalties. 
When carrying out this review, states should follow 
three basic principles. First, they should remove man-
datory pretrial detention and mandatory minimum 
sentences from criminal law books, as they automati-
cally impose harsh prison sentences to drug offenders 
without consideration of their particular circumstanc-
es. Secondly, they should allow for the consideration 
of mitigating factors in sentencing, from being respon-
sible for children and other dependents, to being in 
a situation of vulnerability, having a history of drug 
dependence or being coerced, as this is essential to 
ensure proportionate sentencing for those living in 
poverty and experiencing social exclusion and margin-
alisation. Lastly, states should introduce in all stages of 
the criminal process alternatives to arrest, detention, 
prosecution and incarceration, in order to provide 
comprehensive support –rather than punishment – 
before and after sentencing.
The combination of excessive penalties and a lack of 
alternatives to punishment often leads to prison over-
crowding.  In view of that, states should also consid-
er schemes that facilitate the early release of people 
detained for low-level drug offences, such as reserv-
ing remand prison for extraordinary circumstances, 
enabling early releases under parole, or adopting am-
nesty schemes, as has been done successfully in re-
sponse to the COVID-19 pandemic.121
A gender-sensitive approach 
17 Address women’s needs in cultivation 
areas
The cultivation of crops for the illegal market is report-
ed in most countries in the world, but only minimal 
data is available on the different roles played by men 
and women in cultivation areas.122 There is, however, 
anecdotal research on the gender-related elements 
Across the world, the penalties imposed for 
production and trafficking offences are often 
disproportionate to the harm these offences 
cause, and to the involvement and personal 
circumstances of the person charged with the 
offence. These penalties can often be as severe 
as those imposed for offences such as homicide 
and sexual violence – right up to the death pen-
alty in 35 countries, predominantly in Asia and 
the Middle East.115 Furthermore, most of those 
charged with drug offences already experience 
situations of vulnerability, which leads to the 
entrenchment of economic and power inequal-
ities. For instance, in countries such as Argen-
tina, Brazil, Colombia and Costa Rica, a high 
percentage of incarcerated people had not com-
pleted school or did not have a job when they 
entered prison.116   
Although available information on the number 
of people incarcerated for cannabis-related of-
fences is limited, the UNODC has reported that 
cannabis is the most common used drug world-
wide,117 so it is safe to assume that a significant 
share of those entering the criminal justice sys-
tem for drug offences are primarily prosecuted 
for cannabis-related offenses.
Box 8  Disproportionate 
punishments for drug offences 
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of involvement in cultivation. In areas of Southern 
Africa, research has shown that many older women 
and housewives in rural settings engage in cannabis 
cultivation to sustain their household, replacing male 
family members who may have gone to the city in 
search of employment or who may have passed away, 
often as a result of HIV;123 similarly, a significant share 
of the cannabis cultivation work in the Rif region of 
Morocco is done by women, without them profiting 
proportionally from the income created.124 Addition-
al research conducted in the USA has highlighted the 
gender divisions of labour within cannabis produc-
tion, with men generally involved in heavy labour 
manual tasks and more visible parts of the business 
(such as upfront sales), while women take up behind-
the-scenes roles, working in the garden, trimming or 
preparing other types of cannabis-related products.125 
The women involved in running cannabis businesses 
themselves generally operate as a small family busi-
ness rather than as an extensive industrial complex.126 
In various contexts, cannabis workers reported cas-
es of sexual harassment and assault, discrimination, 
unsafe housing and exploitative working conditions, 
as well as threats and acts of violence to improve 
productivity – with women being particularly vulner-
able.127 In Northern California, for instance, women 
hired as trimmers have denounced a significant num-
ber of sexual assaults.128 In many cases, women rely 
on other men to sell their products in order to avoid 
being intimidated or cheated, making them more vul-
nerable to men’s demands.129 
The situation of vulnerability faced by women in the 
cannabis cultivation industry is further complicated 
by their limited access to land, highlighting an ur-
gent need for land redistribution and agrarian reform 
through a gender lens. Being sensitive to these differ-
ences is essential when developing adequate protec-
tions against labour and sexual exploitation in legally 
regulated markets. Ensuring equal access to education 
and training for both men and women in cultivation 
areas would also ensure equal opportunities to upskill 
their capacities in growing techniques, environmental 
conservation, marketing opportunities, and ensuring 
good quality standards for products.130
18. Ensure access to health services for 
women who use drugs
Traditionally, women have used cannabis for medic-
inal purposes to treat a number of ailments, includ-
ing irregular menstruation, menorrhagia, childbirth, 
post-partum haemorrhage, toxaemic convulsions, 
urine retention, menopause symptoms, etc.131 As 
for drug use for non-medical purposes, although the 
prevalence of cannabis use among women is gener-
ally reported to be lower than for men, global ev-
idence shows that women who are dependent on 
drugs are less likely to access treatment than their 
male counterparts.132 This is due to a number of is-
sues, including the additional social stigma faced 
by women who use drugs (especially when they 
are pregnant and/or mothers), legal issues (such 
as the criminalisation of drug use during pregnan-
cy, and the threat of removal of parental rights), the 
lack of childcare facilities or provisions, and other 
barriers such as impractical opening hours which 
may make it difficult for women to fulfil expected 
family responsibilities. 
Feminist demonistration against prohibition in Rio de Janeiro, Brasil.
Credit: Tom
az Silva/A
gência Brasil CC BY3.0
21
Treatment services may also be either unavailable 
(for both men and women), may be unappealing to 
women (i.e. they may be heavily male-dominated 
environments) and may not provide support such as 
pregnancy care, sexual and reproductive health, men-
tal health services, or measures aiming to address 
gender-based violence.133 These barriers also hold 
true for harm reduction services, few of which are fo-
cusing on addressing women’s specific needs.134 This 
situation makes the availability of gender-sensitive 
harm reduction and drug treatment services all the 
more necessary. 
19 Address gender inequality in a legally 
regulated regime
The role of women in the legal economy is hampered 
by structural gender inequalities across the world, as 
reflected by Sustainable Development Goal 5. Yet little 
discussion has so far taken place on the need to adopt 
a gender-sensitive approaches to legal regulation. As a 
result, the underlying gender inequalities entrenched 
in the legal economy more broadly are now being re-
flected within the regulatory market models estab-
lished for cannabis. 
In order to avoid falling into the trap of further gen-
der inequality within a regulated cannabis market, it 
is critical that the structural failures of both the ille-
gal drug market and other regulated markets are not 
replicated, and that positive actions are undertaken to 
provide more opportunities for women to operate on 
a level playing field as men. 
Learning and improving 
regulation
20 Collect data, monitor the market, and 
gather feedback from communities
Legal regulation is an iterative process, as public of-
ficials review and update the framework in light of 
lessons learnt and the evolution of the market.137 In 
order to carry out this continuous evaluation, poli-
cy-makers, civil society and communities need access 
to reliable and valid data that is consistently gathered 
by neutral bodies and academics, and that reflects all 
the aspects of the regulated markets.    
Public authorities are in a unique position to gather 
information on the multiple dimensions of legal reg-
ulation and its impact on people who use drugs, af-
fected communities, and people living in vulnerable 
situations. Building on the example of Uruguay,138 gov-
ernments should ensure that neutral, independent 
and well-funded research agencies carry out a contin-
uous and long-term evaluation of legal cannabis mar-
ket on the basis of a scientific approach, also integrat-
ing knowledge and experiences from communities 
and civil society. For instance, existing agencies that 
monitor trends in drug use and illegal drug markets, 
such as the European Monitoring Centre on Drugs and 
Drug Addiction, could have their mandate expanded 
to include a continued assessment of innovative reg-
ulatory approaches, and their impacts on drug mar-
kets and people who use drugs. Where relevant, the 
authorities should collect information on the use and 
benefits of cannabis in traditional medicines. Insofar 
as possible, data should be collected through research 
The mobilisation of women calling for drug 
policy reform has consolidated over the past 
decade with the creation of NGOs such as the 
Women and Harm Reduction International Net-
work (WHRIN) or the International Network 
of Women Who Use Drugs (INWUD), and the 
increased engagement of established feminist 
organisations in the drug policy debate. How-
ever, few have so far had a specific focus on le-
gal regulation. 
There are a few notable exceptions, however. 
For instance, the Asociación REMA (State Net-
work of Anti-Prohibitionist Women) in Spain has 
sought to facilitate meetings, networking and 
discussions among women interested in, or af-
fected by, cannabis policies, and their involve-
ment in decision-making processes.135 In Chile, 
MamáCultiva stands out as another example 
of women calling for cannabis policy reform, 
this time for medicinal purposes, and through 
the mobilisation of mothers seeking to provide 
medical cannabis to their children.136 In South-
east Asian countries like the Philippines and In-
donesia, women have had a significant role as 
advocates for medical cannabis reform.
As it has been shown above, communities that 
have been affected by prohibitionist policies 
should be included in the policymaking process 
leading to the establishment of legally regulat-
ed markets. It is essential that women organi-
sations are engaged in the process, as a group 
that has been disproportionally harmed by re-
pressive drug policies, and historically rendered 
invisible. In that regard, involving parliamentary 
committees on women in the legislative pro-
cesses should also be considered.
Box 9  Women mobilising to 
claim their rights
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methods that allow for the active participation of af-
fected communities themselves. The information 
gathered should be made public and available to civil 
society, as it is key to advocacy.
Historically, international data-gathering on drug poli-
cies has focused on supply markets, thus offering lim-
ited and poor-quality data on drug use and demand 
services, which is a reflection of the global system’s 
emphasis on prohibition and control.139 The failure to 
gather, analyse and present data in a fair and compre-
hensive manner is an important barrier to achieving a 
balanced, integrated, and multidisciplinary approach 
to drug policies, to which states have committed.146 
Legal regulation offers an opportunity to re-assess 
this narrow approach, as it allows countries to gain 
a clearer picture of the diverse ramifications of drug 
markets, from economic indicators to access to health 
services and protecting human rights.
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The rate of inclusion of women in senior-level 
executive positions within cannabis companies 
is an interesting indicator. According to a sur-
vey conducted in June 2019 among USA can-
nabis companies, women represented 37% of 
senior-level executives.140 Another report sur-
veying the role of women in the cannabis in-
dustry in the USA, however, found that 38.5% 
of the total surveyed employees in 166 canna-
bis businesses across 17 USA states identified as 
women, but only 17.6% of them held a director 
or executive role.141 A closer look at major can-
nabis corporations show a similar picture. As 
of February 2020, out of the eight executives 
of the Biopharmaceutical Research Company 
(which was one of the additional companies se-
lected to grow cannabis in Uruguay in October 
2019),142 only one was a woman, responsible for 
quality control.143 At the same time, the Aurora 
Cannabis Inc. (Canada) had ten executives, only 
two of whom were women and responsible for 
human resources and corporate law.144 Finally, 
Hexo Corp., one of the largest cannabis compa-
nies in the world, only had one woman within 
its five executives, in the post of ‘Chief People 
Officer’.145 In all these cases, it is well worth not-
ing that none of these women are holding Chief 
Executive or Chief Operating Officer positions. 
Box 10  Women excluded 
from executive power in the 
cannabis industry
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